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1 IN  THE  COURSE  OF  THE  WAR against  the PKK in southeastern Turkey during the 1990s,
Turkish Armed Forces and paramilitary “village guards” systematically evacuated and
destroyed some 3,000 rural settlements. This destruction was enacted as an integral
part of warfare following a Turkish revision of its military tactics and general approach
to the conflict. In this article I will discuss the destruction of rural settlements as part
of  a  counter-insurgency  strategy  implemented  by  the  army  with  the  intention  of
transforming the countryside.  The article  will  argue that the rural  space of  a  huge
swathe of territory was reconstructed, from one which provided sustenance for the
enemy, the PKK, to one which immobilized the enemy at the expense of millions of
rural inhabitants, their livelihoods and their communities.
2 Though much has been written about the war between Turkey and the PKK from socio-
political perspectives [Imset 1995; Barkey and Fuller 1998; White 2000; Bozarslan 2004],
with a few exceptions [Kocher 2004; Etten et al. 2008] the way in which the countryside
has  been used as  a  medium for  warfare  and transformed by the  warfare  itself  has
received comparatively little attention. The relative neglect of the rural aspects of the
war, in terms of state planning and its human consequences, corresponds to a wider
trend in research, at least in Turkish and Kurdish studies, to focus on urban issues, in
particular the impact of public policy on the major population centers as the hubs of
political and social life. Scholarly attention with respect to the Turkish state in its war
with the PKK has focused on the transformation of cities and livelihood issues of forced
migrants  (internally  displaced  persons:  IDPs)  in  their new  urban  environments,
especially in some of Turkey’s principal cities, Istanbul, Mersin, and Ankara, as well as
Diyarbakır, the main city in the Southeast [Çelik 2005; Yılmaz 2006]. Understandable as
it  may  be  that  research  followed  the  displaced  into  the  major  conurbations,  the
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consequence  is  that  the  impact  of  displacement  on  the  countryside  itself  and  the
struggle of those ejected from their homelands has been understudied.
3 Internationally,  however,  the  relationship  between  counter-insurgency  and  the
production of rural space has been a developing field of research. Counter-insurgency
campaigns undertaken by the British in Malaya in the early 1950s, the French in Algeria
in the second half of the 1950s, and the US in Vietnam at the end of the 1950s and
beginning  of  the  1960s  were  all  concerned  with,  and  have  been  studied  as,  a
reconstruction of rural space [Zasloff 1962-1963; Donnell 1970; Sutton 1981; Newsinger
2002]; so too has the background to the conflict in Sri Lanka been analyzed in terms of
rural space and urban/rural and center/periphery dichotomies [Moore 1984;  Woods
1990];  while  more recent studies  of  the Palestinian case have showed how political
control is exercised through spatial management [Signoles 2005], or, more particularly,
spatially embedded [Weizman 2007].
4 Following  such  analyses  of  counter-insurgency  practices,  this  article  will  not  only
discuss the evacuation and destruction of villages, but extend its enquiry into plans and
activities for the region developed by civilian authorities. The aim and activities, it will
be argued, was to reconcile military operations with rural development. To this end, a
master plan for the reconstruction of the region affected by village evacuation and
destruction will be discussed. It will be argued that the scheme for reconstruction, even
though opposed by the military,  was developed from a similar logic  of  control  and
supervision  as  that  underlying  the  initial  evacuation  and  destruction  of  rural
settlements.  In proposing the development of  a new settlement structure,  this plan
envisaged a transformation of rural space on the basis of schematic categories based on
control  and supervision from outside and above.  As  such,  it  will  be  concluded,  the
destruction associated with war and the reconstruction associated with peace, far from
contradicting each other, have actually been complementary.
5 The main actors in the conflict discussed are the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK.
The Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri), the organizational framework for the
state  military,  includes,  among  other  branches,  the  army  and  the  gendarmerie
(jandarma), a quasi-military police force operative in mostly rural areas (i.e. in areas not
covered by the regular police). The Turkish Armed Forces assumed a political role of
the guardian of the state and took the leadership of the country with periods of coups
and military rule [Cizre 1997: 151-166].
6 The PKK is  the Kurdish acronym for the Kurdistan Workers’  Party (Partiya Karkerên
Kurdistan), whose guerrilla led an armed insurgency in the southeast of Turkey from
1984  (it  has  mostly  been  observing  a  self-declared  ceasefire  during  recent  years).
Formally established in 1978, the PKK emerged from a student and urban environment
during the period 1973-1977.  The founding members of the party met in Ankara as
housemates,  in university classes and in left-wing student and youth organizations.
Initially the group was organized as a fluid network. The junctions in the network were
rented houses, which were changed frequently, and in which meetings, recruitment,
and ideological group formation took place [Jongerden and Akkaya 2010]. In 1977, this
group  –  a  party  had  not  yet  been  established  –  decided  to  establish  itself  in  the
Kurdistan  Region  in  the  southeast  of  Turkey,  from  which  it  planned  to  develop  a
revolutionary struggle. A military coup in Turkey in 1980 and the severe repression
unleashed obstructed PKK plans, resulting in a retreat to outside the borders of Turkey.
However,  the retreat  was temporary.  During the course of  the 1980s,  the PKK sent
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militants  educated  in  guerrilla  warfare  in  northern Lebanon back  to  the  Kurdistan
Region in Turkey, and started to build up forces in the countryside. In this build-up of
forces, villages in the countryside became for the organization what the houses had
been in the urban environment: the nodes in an extended network. They were both
stepping stones for swift movement as well as resources, the villages now providing the
guerrilla with shelter, logistical support, recruits and intelligence.
7 The PKK, it will be argued, used an insurgency strategy which involved the progressive
development of spatial control and counter-institutions. Though the PKK had a well-
organized network of militants in the towns and cities in the region, the build-up of
forces took place where the state was weakest,  i.e.  the peripheral  countryside.  The
party aimed at taking over the rural areas first, with the towns and cities to follow only
in the final stage of the war. Initially, the Turkish Armed Forces decided just to defend
the larger villages and towns. In doing so, they allowed the PKK the space to establish a
guerrilla network throughout the Southeast,  and unintentionally contributed to the
fulfillment of the PKK strategy. However, the PKK’s dependence on this space also was,
this article will argue, the guerrilla’s weak point, and spatial deprivation its Achilles
heel.  The  Turkish  state’s  evacuation  and  destruction  of  villages  was  not  simply
punishment, nor a mindless response, or collateral damage. On the contrary, it  was
constitutive of the counter-insurgency strategy of the Turkish military to change the
space of combat to its favor [Özdağ 2003; Pamukoğlu 2003].
8 Village Evacuations
9 As  part  of  its  counter-insurgence  operations,  Turkish  Armed Forces  evacuated  and
destroyed rural settlements on a large scale. According to official figures, 833 villages
and  2,382  small  rural  settlements,  totalling  3,215  settlements,  were  evacuated  and
destroyed in 14 provinces in the East and Southeast, namely Adiyaman, Ağrı, Batman,
Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli and Van
[Oyan  et  al. eds.  2001].  In  these  provinces,  the  total  number  of  rural  settlements
(villages and hamlets) had been 12,737 [Doğanay 1993: 6-7]. In other words, around a
quarter of all rural settlements in the east-southeast region of Turkey were emptied.
Numbers provided by the Human Rights Association (HRA) in Turkey and the Kurdish
Human Rights Project (KHRP) suggest that most evacuations occurred in the period
1991-1995, peaking in 1993-1994 (Table 1 p. 80).
10 The  approximate  number  of  settlements  evacuated  and  destroyed  is  not  really  in
dispute, but the number of people affected has been a subject of great controversy.
Government sources are extraordinarily precise. They report that 384,793 people were
evacuated during the 1990s. Human Rights Organizations, however, claim that Turkey
deliberately presents low numbers to camouflage the magnitude of the displacement,1
and have estimated the number of displaced at as high as 3 to 4 million, i.e. ten times
the government figure.2 Other calculations tend more towards 1.5 million [Aker et al.
2005: 8] or put the figure between 950,000 and 1,200,000 [Tezcan and Koç 2006]. Since
reliable statistics are not available, the number of displaced persons is necessarily a
rough estimate.
 
Table 1. Evacuated and Destroyed Villages, 1991-2001
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
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109 295 874 1,531 243 68 23 30 30 – 3
Source: Kurdish Human Rights Project, “Internally Displaced Persons: The Kurds in Turkey”, 2002.
11 The resettlement of the rural population did not take the form of a scheme, in the sense
of an elaborate and systematic plan of action encompassing the provision of shelter and
the  reconstruction  of  livelihood  and/or  granting  of  compensation,  and  for  the
execution  of  which  specific  personnel  and  resources  were  allocated.  Rather,  the
evacuation  of  villages  was  organized  in  the  form of  what  I  term a  “rural-to-urban
resettlement  tracks”,  defined  as  (multiple)  routes  from  rural  to  urban  settlement
entities along which people were forced to move, without support or assistance from
authorities  [Jongerden 2007].  In  contrast  to  a  scheme,  tracked resettlement is  little
more than a collection of multiple routes from hamlet and village to town and city.
12 The evacuation and destruction of villages was haphazard but orchestrated. During my
fieldwork in the region, forced migrants in Diyarbakır explained how the process of
evacuation and destruction had taken place  in  their  village.  At  first,  the  army put
pressure on the villagers to become village guards.3 They refused. Some of the villagers
I spoke to asked rhetorically, and rather shrewdly:
The state is our state, and those in the mountains are our brothers – how can we
choose between the state and our brothers?
13 As a consequence of the villagers’ refusal to become part of the militia, the military
evacuated the village. After that, village guards from a nearby village moved in and
plundered  the  place.  Wheat  stocks  and  animals  were  stolen,  window  frames  and
doorposts broken out of the houses and taken away [Jongerden 2007: 253-254]. There
are many narratives  like this,  and,  taken together,  they reveal  a  pattern.  A typical
village evacuation would proceed as follows. Villagers would be put under pressure to
join the so-called village guards. If they refused and did not leave their village after
warnings and pressure, then regular soldiers and/or special teams would one day enter
the  village  and  order  the  village  chief  (the  muhtar)  to  gather  the  inhabitants  and
evacuate the settlement.  Sometimes villagers  were given the opportunity  to  collect
their belongings, but often the village was plundered or soldiers would begin firing at
the houses and set fire to them together with their contents. Livestock would be stolen
or shot, orchards and crops burned. The villagers would take refuge in a nearby town,
later moving to a main city in the region (such as Van or Diyarbakır), from where many
would  continue  their  journeys  to  cities  in  the  West  (such  as  Adana,  Mersin,  and
Istanbul).
14 The concern of the military was to clear the villages. They were not concerned with
what happened to the people after eviction, and in the towns and cities the hundreds of
thousands  (or  millions)  of  displaced  were  left  to  their  own devices.4 Most  found  a
temporary place to stay first and long-term shelter after that, mainly through chain-
migration and self-help. The chain-migration mechanism implied that the evacuated
selected urban centers which had already been established as settlement destinations
by their  relatives  or  hemşehri  (people from the same place of  origin).  The self-help
method implied that they would re-establish themselves in the urban entities through
informal support networks.
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A Rural Insurgency
15 In  the  years  preceding  the  evacuation  and  destruction  of  villages,  the  PKK  had
established itself in the countryside. It was at a meeting in Ankara at the beginning of
1976 that the cadres of the organization decided to start a process of party-building in
the Kurdish Region. This process was initiated in urban areas elsewhere, in particular
at centers of higher education.5 Then, in 1977, a decision was taken to prepare for a
prolonged people’s war, although the execution of this strategy only followed after the
military  coup  d’État  of  1980.  Following  the  strategy  developed  by  Mao,  the  PKK
envisaged  a  three-stage  struggle:  strategic  defense  (armed  propaganda,  small  scale
attacks, mobile warfare), followed by strategic balance, and finally a strategic offensive
[İmset 1995; Özdağ 2003].
16 The three-stage model involved a move from guerrilla to conventional warfare. The
shift  from  guerrilla  to  mobile  warfare  was  considered  necessary  to  annihilate  the
enemy’s manpower and to liberate land. In combination with a popular uprising, the
guerrilla army was supposed to force the Turkish army to leave all the Kurdish land it
was occupying, i.e. Kurdistan in Turkey (as the PKK saw it) [Jongerden 2007]. According
to the theory of asymmetric warfare, such a final battle is only to be launched once the
enemy has become bogged down and demoralized, psychologically prepared for defeat
[Beckett and Pimlott eds. 1985: 59].
17 In the early 1980s, small armed units composed of 3 to 5 militants6 had moved through
the region, spreading propaganda; by the beginning of the 1990s, roughly from 1990 to
1992,  the  PKK established  control  over  much of  the  countryside  in  the  (primarily)
Kurdish region of Turkey. In PKK terms, these were considered “semi-liberated zones”.
In these areas – large parts of the provinces of Hakkari,  Van, Şırnak, Siirt,  Batman,
Diyarbakır,  Bingöl  –  the  PKK  established  a  permanent  presence.  The  region  was
essentially controlled by a network of guerrilla units. These had their own local bases
but  were  also  in  regular  (near  daily)  contact  with  other  local  guerrilla  forces,  and
sometimes even lodged them in the many small rural settlements in the area. These
hamlets and villages provided not only shelters, but also intelligence, recruits, and food
supplies. These were the material and immaterial components of the network, allowing
swift and informed movement throughout the region.
18 The decision of the PKK to build up forces in the countryside was based on the party’s
analysis  of  the  state  as  being  weak  in  rural  areas,  which was  certainly  the  case.
Although Turkey’s state system was marked by centralization and authoritarianism, it
was in practice rather detached from large parts of the countryside which were outside
its  control  [Jongerden  2009].  Indeed,  many  villagers  only  knew  the  state  from
occasional patrol  missions by units of  the gendarmerie.  The relative absence of the
state in rural  areas,  in particular the more remote and mountainous ones,  and the
antagonistic social relations between the state and the Kurdish population, made the
countryside a good “site” for guerrilla warfare [Jongerden and Akkaya 2010].
19 In  1982,  at  a  time  when  armed  guerrilla  units  of  the  PKK  moved  through  the
mountainous  border  region  with  Iraq  to  mobilize  support,  avoiding  direct
confrontations with the state, a study by the State Planning Organization put squarely
on record the weakness of the state’s spatial-administrative system. The study showed
that many of the rural settlements in Turkey, and not only in the Kurdish Region, were
effectively outside the formal administrative system, and simply self-governing.7 This
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was an important reason why the PKK was initially able to move around rather freely.
The state was weak in the rural areas, and had no control over smaller settlements.
20 The  countryside  provided  good cover  and  concealment  (typically  mountainous  and
forested areas) as well as practical support for the PKK from the local population; it
afforded a physical and social environment that operated as a force-multiplier for those
conducting a war of movement. For the state forces, on the other hand, the population
being dispersed,  the physical  terrain rugged,  and the communication and transport
infrastructure poor combined as factors of a force-diffuser. The military were “diluted”
in  the  territory  [Kocher  2004].  This  was  clearly  a  serious  disadvantage  for  the
supervision and control of the population and effective combat against the guerrilla.
 
Diffuse Warfare
21 Unintentionally,  the  army’s  combat  strategy  contributed  to  the  success  of  the  PKK
[Özdağ 2003]. The Turkish military took up defensive and static positions, especially at
night, when soldiers were thought to be safe in their enclosures. Garrisons were built
and fortified, and army units confined themselves to these garrisons. Operations were
carried  out,  but  units  returned  to  their  barracks  before  dusk.  The  Turkish  Armed
Forces had decided to concentrate on the defense of larger settlements and refrain
from night-time operations, and thus did not hinder the PKK from establishing and
even tightening control over the smaller settlements, or from moving by night. Every
now and then the army would organize large sweeps, sending tens of thousands troops
into an area, but these actions were not very effective as the guerrilla escaped into
hiding while the troops were being massed and stayed away during the operation only
to  return  after  its  completion  and  the  troops’  retreat.  In  spite  of  its  numerical
superiority – in 1993, a state force of 185,000 (excluding the gendarmerie and village
guards) was pitted against some 15,000 to 20,000 guerrilla fighters – the Turkish army
rapidly lost control [Özdağ 2003; Pamukoğlu 2003].
22 American military sources ascribed the poor performance of the Turkish army during
the 1986-1993 period to the lack of an integrated strategic counter-insurgency doctrine.
The military strategy of the Turkish army was based on the doctrine of static territorial
defense by a standing army against a coherent mega-threat (i.e.  an invading Soviet
army), centrally organized and clearly identifiable. The war with the PKK did not fit
these  doctrinal  remnants  of  the  Cold  War.  On  the  contrary,  the  PKK  guerrilla
specifically  avoided  classic,  pitched  battles.  Instead,  the  PKK’s  war  tactics  were
characterized by what may be termed call “poly-centricity”, “multi-directionality” and
“multi-dimensionality” [Hardt and Negri 2004: 69-92]. They were “poly-centric” in that
the “people’s army” did not have one single center, but was composed of innumerable
relatively independent units, clustering with and separating from other units whenever
deemed  necessary;  “multi-directional”  because  the  guerrilla army  was  difficult  to
locate, its militants permanently on the move and giving the impression of being able
to  attack  at  any  time  and  any  place;  and  “multi-dimensional”  since  not  all  party
militants were full-time guerrillas, but were active as milis, hidden militia in both rural
settlements and urban centers that could shift swiftly between the roles of fighter and
civilian  (the  milis had  responsibilities  for  the  provision  of  logistical  support  and
intelligence, and were often active in civil society organizations, such as trade unions).8
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23 The army learned that a counter-insurgency war could not be fought from a defensive
and static position. Therefore the Turkish Armed Forces developed a new strategy, the
field  domination  doctrine,  and  new  tactics  on  the  ground.  The  field  domination
doctrine  had been laid  down in  1991,  but  not  put  into  full  practice  until  after  the
reorganization  of  the  army,  initiated  in  1992  and  completed  in  1993.  In  this  new
conceptualization of warfare, the army did not adapt itself to the rural boundaries as
determined by the rural geometry, but reorganized the rural syntax in accordance to
its own ideas. It started to consider the countryside not as a site where the fighting
took place, but as a medium for warfare, to be shaped and changed by “micro-tactics”.
A central objective of the field domination doctrine was to bring about a contraction of
rural space. This contraction, annulling remoteness, inaccessibility and distance, was
realized through a combination of geopolitics and dromopolitics.9 While the latter took
the form of a focus on military mobility and rapid response, the former was based on
the evacuation and destruction of rural settlements as a means to “smooth” space.
 
EVACUATION
24 The Armed Forces were suspicious of the villagers in so-called “PKK populated areas”
[Özdağ 2003: 33], and enforced firm measures against the rural populations. In addition
to  curfews,  villages  were  put  under  food embargoes,  allowed only  to  bring  limited
amounts of flour, rice and other food products into their settlements. A man from Siirt
described the situation thus:
Economic sanctions are applied against our village. [...] For example, a family of 4 to
5 persons will be allowed to buy 50 kilograms of flour. If you want to buy food, you
first have to go to the gendarmerie. After you have identified yourself and they
have checked the number of people in the household, you get a form which states
how much you can buy of what products. You take the form with you when you go
to the city, and when you return they check if the amounts are in accordance with
what is written on the form. If you had more with you than written on the form, the
goods were confiscated and you were taken for interrogation [Jongerden et al. 1997:
44].
25 The Armed Forces started to systematically evacuate and destroy villages considered
supportive of the PKK at the beginning of the 1990s.10 This came increasingly to be
regarded as a productive strategy. The army inverted the rationale of guerrilla warfare
as formulated by Mao Tse Tung:
Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by
them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies
and cooperation.11
26 The logic employed by the military in Turkey was, conversely, to force this separation.
The evacuation of the population was intended to isolate the guerrilla forces from the
population and deprive them of finance, intelligence, food, shelter and recruits. The
evacuation of rural settlements reduced opportunities to cooperate with the guerrilla.
27 The military openly hinted at  a  large-scale evacuation of  rural  settlements and the
concentration of the population in a few large settlements. In the words of General
Osman Pamukoğlu, who headed the fight against the PKK in Hakkari:
Where there is  sea,  there are pirates.  In this province [Hakkari]  [there] are 674
villages and hamlets. These settlements form the spider’s web in which the PKK
feeds itself. [...] Why don’t we concentrate all [the villagers] in two or three main
settlements? [Pamukoğlu 2003: 59]
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28 With no  major  resettlement  schemes  organized  and the  rural  population forced to
leave their houses and flee to urban settlements, rural depopulation took place on a
massive  scale.  In  the  Kurdish  region  administered  under  the  state  of  emergency
regulation, a huge rural-to-urban migration took place. According to Matthew Kocher:
The region of emergency rule urbanized at nearly a three times the rate of the rest
of Turkey [while] the rural population declined by 12% in absolute terms, at a time
of torrid population growth [2002: 41].
29 If we break down the numbers and focus on provincial and district levels, we see that
the rural population in some provinces and districts with relatively high numbers of
mountain villages, such as the districts Lice, Kulp, Hazro, Kocaköy and Dicle (in the
province of Diyarbakır), dropped by tens of percent [Kocher 2002: 8]. Large areas of the
countryside  were  completely  depopulated.  Using  satellite  images,  a  case  study  for
Dersim/Tunceli12 suggests  that  village  evacuation  and  destruction  was  often
accompanied by widespread forest-burning [Etten et al. 2008: 1795] in order to smooth
out space and destroy potential guerrilla hideouts.
30 The  evacuation  of  villages  should  not  be  considered  a  side-effect  of  the  counter-
insurgency of the Turkish Armed Forces – notwithstanding the gradual and undeclared
way in which it was introduced and extended – but one of its primary constituents,
intended to contribute directly to the “environmental deprivation” of the guerrilla. It
was a means of destroying the guerrilla’s physical and social environment, intended to
force the guerrilla either into isolated retreat (high in the mountains, across the border
with Iraq) or else into undesired, hastily planned combat in “urban” environments. In
other words, space was not a background for the actions of the Turkish Armed Forces,
as it had been in the initial phase of the war (up until 1991), not an abstract grid on
which events occurred, but rather, as Eyal Weizman [2007: 7] puts it, “The medium that
each of their actions seeks to challenge, transform or appropriate”. By reorganizing
rural space, the army intended to establish control, and suppress the insurgency.
31 The smoothing of rural space by means of village evacuation and destruction was a
necessary step for the army to achieve the desired spatial contraction, but not enough.
Permanent, partly-manned checkpoints as well as temporary, mobile checkpoints were
established to divide the space and create a matrix of control. Though checkpoints may
initially emerge as a series of tactical responses of military officers, they can assume an
overall  strategic  lay-out  [Weizman  2007:  146].  The  matrix  of  control  enabled  the
supervision and regulation of movements of people and goods. Young men and women
whose identity cards showed that they were from another area were questioned, the
types of goods taken into (or from) an area were checked, and the quantities subject to
limitations in order to cut off supplies to the PKK [Marcus 2007: 222].
32 It is important to note that such measures as village evacuation and destruction, the
burning  of  belongings  and  the  environment,  and  restrictions  on  the  movement  of
people and goods only are possible in a context of weak citizenship. Beyond the already
weak  sense  of  state  (see  above)  –  in  the  sense  of  a  relationship  to  higher  (civil)
authorities to which recourse was even conceivable (let alone practically accessible) in
the minds of villagers – the implementation of the state of emergency (Olağanüstü Hal:
OHAL) in the Southeast created what Weizman [2007] names a zone of weak citizenship,
i.e. a region where civil rights are restricted.13
33 A raft  of  measures  was employed to  restrict  political  activities  in  the OHAL region
during this period. In addition to routine military and police activities (including the
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system of checkpoints), freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom to
organize  were  practically  abolished  in  the  Southeast.  Daily  newspapers  available
outside the OHAL region were banned inside it,  events and demonstrations allowed
elsewhere were forbidden, and many associations forcibly disbanded. Politically active
public sector employees were subject to exile outside the region. And it was in this
political  environment  of  weak  citizenship  that  the  Regional  Governor  was  granted
strong  powers,  among  them  the  authority  to  evacuate  rural  settlements  if  he  was
advised that this would render the region more secure. In other words, the OHAL was a
spatially-grounded state of exception.14
 
Organization of Mobility
34 Following the new doctrine, the General Staff decided to reorganize the army, shifting
from a cumbrous divisional and regimental structure (designed in the period of the
Cold  War)  to  a  relatively  flexible  corps  and  brigade  structure  (to  fight  a  multi-
directional and multi-dimensional internal enemy), which was supposed to contribute
to a more rapid response and higher mobility.15 Prior to the army reorganization, the
principal tactical units had consisted of 16 infantry divisions and 1 armored division,
plus 23 independent brigades, of which 6 were armored and 4 mechanized. Basically,
the  Turkish  land  force  was  a  large  but  badly  equipped  infantry  force.  Under  the
reorganization, all except 3 of the 17 infantry divisions were dismantled. The existing 9
corps were retained, with brigades directly responsible to the corps commanders and
more flexible in their modus operandi.
35 The Armed Forces abandoned the approach of garrison line-of-defense as its primary
military tactic.  As General  Osman Pamukoğlu,  commander of  the Hakkari  Mountain
Warfare and Commando Brigade between 1993 and 1995 wrote:
Garrisons do not provide protection [...] but because of their static disposition are
targets for the enemy [2003: 137].
36 As part of the new strategy of spatial control, Commando brigades and Special Forces
became key elements in the war against the PKK. Their soldiers were supposed to stay
in the field day and night,  searching for PKK units  and camps.  In addition,  Special
Action Teams (Özel Haraket Timleri), under the authority of the police, and Special Teams
(Özel Tim), under the authority of the gendarmerie (these with a combined total of 15 to
20,000 men), were created as rapid response units.
37 The old approach of positional warfare was not entirely abandoned, insofar as the job
of  the  garrison  was  farmed  out  to  civilian  militia.  Crucially,  however,  these  were
located in small settlements, in the villages as opposed to towns, thus extending the
depth of  spatial  control.  The system of village guards,  Korucular,  was established in
conjunction  with  the  abandonment  of  the  old  garrison  system,  instituted  as  the
Temporary and Voluntary Village Guards (Geçici ve Gönüllü Köy Korucuları) – somewhat
of a euphemistic misnomer – and incorporated into the organization of the Turkish
Armed Forces.
38 Numerical superiority was considered a key element in the establishment of spatial
control. Between 1993 and 1995, the number of Turkish troops and paramilitaries in the
region was almost doubled, from 185,000 to 360,000 men (including as many as 70,000
village guards). In Hakkari, for example, the land forces in 1995 comprised fourteen
battalions  amounting  to  56,000  soldiers,  with  five  battalions  employed  in  a  war  of
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movement. These five battalions were organized into special units of “go-getters” who
lived in the mountains for weeks, hunting the guerrilla. The other nine battalions had
regular tasks to fulfill,  generally involved in patrolling an assigned area. When PKK
guerrillas were spotted in the matrix, the mission of regular units was not to engage
into contact, but to surround the guerrilla. Special units were transported to the area
by helicopter and took up the pursuit. The field domination strategy of the Turkish
Armed Forces did not mean that the army had always to be everywhere, but rather that
it could be anywhere at any time. The smoothing of space and rapid response facility
were the necessary conditions for this.
39 Rapid  response  is  dependent  on  reliable  intelligence,  good  communication  and
infrastructure, and means for the transport and movement of troops. In order to secure
timely and accurate intelligence, it was emphasized that the army had to show it was in
control.  The  Armed  Forces  improved  the  network  of  roads  and  communication
facilities,  and  modernized  its  armament  and  transportation  for  a  more  effective
employment of troops over land and by air [Özdağ 2003: 53]. This included the purchase
and use of helicopters, enabling a speedy deployment of commando and infantry troops
across  difficult  terrain,  and  new  armored  infantry  fighting  vehicles  and  armored
personnel carrier vehicles.
 
A New Reality on the Ground
40 The Turkish military’s new geopolitical tactics (the intersection of space and power)
and dromopolitical tactics (the intersection of pace and power) profoundly changed the
rural space of war, from a network of support for the guerrilla into a matrix of control
by the army. That the situation on the ground had changed considerable was illustrated
by the words of a former PKK commander:
The evacuation of the villages really helped the state. [...] The villagers provided
everything  for  us,  supplied  materials  and  information.  When  the  villages  were
emptied, all this was taken away from us [Marcus 2007: 222].
41 The  PKK  units  were  henceforth  seriously  hampered  by  logistical  problems.  The
countryside was emptied, and fighters could not move easily without being spotted. It
was not only that resources had been lost, but also that the state’s mobile units were in
hot pursuit. The army shook off its cumbrous inertia. Its forces continuously tried to
engage  in  fighting,  entering  areas  they  had never  entered  and which the  guerrilla
considered a safe sanctuary. Ironically, however, just as the army had contributed to
the success of the PKK strategy in the initial stage of the war, so did the unfolding of
the PKK strategy contribute to the army’s success in the period after 1993.
42 At its height, the PKK had established hegemony in large parts of the Southeast, in
particular in Serhat (covering parts of Hakkari, Van and some territories in Iraq and
Iran), Garzan (covering parts of Batman, Siirt, Van, Hizan and Gevaş), Botan (covering
parts  of  Şırnak,  Hakkari,  Van,  Siirt,  Eruh  and  parts  of  Northern  Iraq),  and  Amed
(covering  parts  of  Diyarbakır,  Bingöl,  Genç,  and  Muş).  Although  the  PKK  did  not
establish  permanent  control,  it  succeeded  in  preventing  the  security  forces  from
entering  or  remaining  in  these  areas  for  long  periods  of  time.  These  areas  were
considered to be one step away from the establishment of so-called “liberated zones”
and had the status of “semi-liberated zones” (marking a transition from the phase of
“strategic defense” to that of “strategic balance”).
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43 In  June  1993,  PKK  leader  Murat  Karayılan  confidently  announced  that  a  so-called
Parliament of  Kurdistan would be established in the liberated area of Botan on the
Turkish  side  of  the  border  with  Iraq.  In  line with  the  objective  of  creating  and
defending liberated areas,  the PKK started to move to conventional warfare tactics.
Larger units were created which more often moved in combination, in groups of up to
several hundred guerrilla fighters. At times, the PKK resisted with positional warfare.
In other words, by 1993 the army had started to apply guerrilla tactics, while the PKK
was  preparing  for  conventional  warfare  [Özdağ  2003].  Guerrilla  commanders,
confronted with heavy losses, wanted to break up back into smaller units and dilute
forces,  but the PKK leadership,  keeping to its  overall  war plan and most likely not
properly appreciative of the change in its enemy’s, insisted on a regular army strategy
[Marcus 2007: 223].
 
Warfare by Means of Reconstruction
44 A top-secret letter written in 1993 by President Turgut Özal revealed some of the basic
characteristics  of  the  counter-insurgency strategy that  began to  emerge in  Turkey.
Turgut Özal had been Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey between 1983 and 1989,
the period in which the PKK had developed into a force capable not just of causing the
Turkish state problems, but of actually winning the struggle for independence from
Ankara and achieving the establishment of Kurdistan as a state. In 1989, Özal ascended
to the presidency, even as the PKK was rising to the height of its power, effectively
controlling great swathes of supposedly Turkish territory. He knew as well as anyone
how grave the situation had become. Shortly before his sudden death on the 17th of
April 1993, the president wrote a secret letter to the then Prime Minister, Süleyman
Demirel, proposing a solution to the PKK insurgency. In this letter, he emphasized the
severity of the threat posed by the PKK:
In the Southeast [...] we are faced with perhaps the most significant problem in the
Republic’s history.16
45 Turgut Özal outlined not only the need, but also the main lines of the new war strategy.
Part of that strategy was,  indeed, village evacuations – but a second stage also was
concerned  with  what  should  be  done  after  these  villages  had  been  evacuated  and
destroyed. Özal made the following suggestion:
Starting with the most troubled zones, villages and hamlets in the mountains of the
region  should  be  gradually  evacuated.  [...]  With  the  evacuation  of  mountain
settlements,  the  terrorist  organization  (PKK)  will  have  been  isolated.  Security
forces should immediately move in and establish complete control in such areas. To
prevent the locals’ return to the region, the building of a large number of dams in
appropriate places is an alternative.
46 More than fifteen years since Özal wrote this letter, in Dersim/Tunceli and Hakkari,
two  mountainous  areas  that  continue  to  be  hotspots  of  the  conflict,  where  PKK
guerrillas  are  even  now  able  to  find  shelter  and  move,  preparations  for  the
construction of two series of dams are being made. Eight dams have been planned for
the  Tunceli  region  and  eleven  for  Hakkari,  which  will  turn  large  parts  of  the
countryside  into  artificial  lakes.  The  construction  of  dams  in  Dersim/Tunceli  is
purportedly  intended  to  contribute  to  development,  but  the  local  population  is
convinced that the dams are to be built to evict them [Ronayne 2004: 47]. In Hakkari the
dams are to be constructed in an area largely evacuated in the 1990s. The dams will be
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built wall-like, with the express purpose of making it difficult for PKK guerrilla-fighters
to  penetrate  Turkey’s  borders  [Jongerden  2010].  According  to  the  authorities,  the
mountainous region, with its many caves, contains many cross-border trails. Elongated
dams are to be constructed on such sites, in ribbon formation. With preparations for
their construction already underway, this project will replace earlier ideas for a five-
meter high concrete wall along this border. The dams are strikingly visible markers of
the transformation of rural space taking place in the southeast of Turkey.
47 In his letter, Turgut Özal also referred to the development of cities into centers for
population growth in the region. In this respect, he made the following suggestion:
Such cities as Adiyaman, Diyarbakır, Urfa, Mardin, Siirt, Elazığ, Malatya, Erzincan,
Erzurum, Kars, Ardahan, and Iğdır [...] must be turned into centers of attraction for
the local population currently settled in the countryside.
48 Actually  several  plans  were  made  to  scheme  the  urban  resettlement  of  rural
populations. Two examples are the 1994 toplu kondu and toplu çiftlik plans. Developed by
the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı), the
toplu kondu (collective shelter) project was designed as a hybrid of the shantytown type
dwellings known as gecekondu (literally “night shelters”, implying that they are put up
overnight, under cover of darkness), and the government housing program toplu konut
(collective housing). In the toplu kondu blocks, the government was to provide basic,
one-floor shelters of 50 square meters on pieces of land varying in size between 200 and
400  square  meters.  Inhabitants  were  supposed  to  construct  additional  floors,  extra
rooms or workplaces according to their own needs and means. Several of these toplu
kondu blocks, with a total of 8,000 shelters, were planned near economic growth centers
of the cities Adana, Urfa, Diyarbakır and Gaziantep, and another 2,000 shelters in the
proximity of  several  district  towns in the provinces of  Adana,  Urfa,  Diyarbakır and
Gaziantep.17
49 A  similar  plan  proposed  by  then  Prime  Minister  Tansu  Çiller  envisioned  the
construction of large settlements with an average population of 1,000 inhabitants each.
These settlements were referred to as toplu çiftlik modeli projesi (collective farm model
projects), or simply toplu çiftlik (collective farms). Despite its name, the toplu çiftlik plan
was meant to resettle people in the vicinity of urban areas. These two schemes were
not implemented, but a few projects incorporating ideas embodied in the toplu kondu
and toplu çiftlik projects have been realized, as out-of-town developments near urban
centers.  Examples  are  the  construction of  Beşyüzevler,  near  the  city  of  Diyarbakır;
Doğankent,  near the provincial  center of  Hakkari;  and Kandolar  Mahallesi,  Afet  Evleri
(literally “Kandolar Quarter”,  “Disaster Houses”),  also known as “80 Evler”,  near the
district town of Ovacik, in the province of Tunceli. Neither of these schemes – toplu
kondu or toplu çiftlik – were implemented on a large scale, since Turkey failed to find the
funds needed.18
50 A year later, in 1995, the issue of village return entered the political agenda, when a
coalition government of the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi: DYP) and the Republican
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: CHP) proposed a return-to-village program in
the context of the Southeast Restoration Project (Güneydoğu Onarım Projesi: GOP). Not
much  information  is  available  about  this  program,  although  it  was  reportedly  a
blueprint for the organization of a gradual return to those evacuated villages where
security could be provided. Politically significant was its acknowledgement that people
from villages which had been evacuated and destroyed (by the army) might be eligible
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for return. The idea was opposed by the military and governors in the region, who
claimed that a re-habitation of evacuated villages would create a security risk. In 1997,
Mesut Yılmaz, leader of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi: ANAP) and the then
Prime  Minister,  also  announced  that  his  government  would  support  the  return  of
evacuated populations to their villages. Although return was again made conditional on
the ability of the army to provide security, the implicit, and fundamental, purport was
that the evacuation of the countryside was an anomaly, and return inescapable.
51 A comprehensive master-plan for return was drafted in 2001 under Prime Minister
Bülent Ecevit,  leader of  the nationalist  Democratic  Left  Party (Demokratik  Sol  Partisi:
DSP). Research for the plan was conducted under Professors Oyan and Ersoy.19 It was
coordinated  by  the  Southeast  Anatolia  Project  (Güneydoğu  Anadolu  Projesi: GAP),  an
organization originally established to coordinate the construction of dams and related
large infrastructural works.20 As a regional administrative body, GAP had experience in
the  preparation  and  implementation  of  large-scale  infrastructural  programs  at  the
regional  level.  Moreover,  GAP  administration  had  experience  with  resettlement
projects. For the construction of eight dams in the region, 336 settlements had been or
were  to  be  evacuated,  affecting,  according  to  government  statistics,  about  180,000
people living in approximately 25,000 households. Finally, in response to the rise of the
PKK,  GAP  had  been  given  the  responsibility  to,  in  effect  (but,  I  argue,  quite
intentionally), contribute to the combat through rural development projects.
52 A close look at the Village Return and Rehabilitation Development Plan shows that it
was organized as a hierachization of space in order to facilitate control. While the name
of the plan might suggest that it was intended to provide for the return of villagers to
their settlements,  this  was not actually the case.  The only “return”,  in fact,  was to
geographical location, to the general vicinity. Rather, the ultimate objective – and the
only  realistic framework in  which  return  might  take  place  –  was  a  new geo-social
(spatial) structure, one that would facilitate the establishment of effective control over
groups of settlements.
53 It was acknowledged in the plan that the evacuation of villages and the displacement of
people had inflicted great pains and sorrows on those involved, but that the forced
evacuation had to be considered an opportunity for the creation of something new, i.e.
the  creation  of  the  conditions  in  which  the  “forced  migrants”  could  become more
productive, both for themselves and for “their country”. The evacuation of the rural
settlements, therefore, was treated as an opportunity for the development of a new
settlement  structure  that  was  more  “rational”  and  “vital”.  The  old  dispersed  and
unproductive  settlement  units  were  to  be  exchanged  for  new  settlement  units  of
sufficient size and potential. At the core of the plan, therefore, was the concept of a
transformed rural space [Oyan et al. eds. 2001: 1].
54 The master-planners endeavored to reorganize the scattered and therefore difficult-to-
supervise settlement structure and to create a more transparent rural structure. And
the creation of transparency was to be created through rehabilitation, which did not
refer to some kind of restitution of the modes of livelihood and social systems of the
forced migrants, wrecked by evacuation and village destruction, but to the creation of
the  necessary  framework  for  the  establishment  and  effective  operation  of  state
institutions in the region [Oyan et al.  eds. 2001: 5]. Apart from the construction of a
road  and  highway  network  providing  easy  access  to  the  region,  the  scatter  of
settlements had to be reorganized in such a way that they would become “legible” for
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outsiders, i.e. state representatives. This is the prime logic behind the application of a
model  approach,  as  it  enables  the  reduction  of  complex  realities  to  schematic
categories [Scott 1998: 77]. To accomplish a schematic simplification in the settlement
structure, the master-planners introduced two concepts: the concept of sub-region (alt-
bölge) and center-village (merkez-köy) [Oyan et al. eds. 2001].
 
Table 2. Center-Village Pilot Projects and Their History of Designation
Province District Sub-Region
  Center-Village Number of dependent settlements
Batman Gercüş Vergili 13 villages  4 hamlets
Bingöl Genç Yagğızca  3 villages 22 hamlets
Bitlis Center Karınca  6 villages
Diyarbakır Çüngüs Yeniköy  9 villages  3 hamlets
Elaziğ Palu Arındık  2 villages  6 hamlets
Hakkari Center Kaval  6 villages  4 hamlets
Mardin Ömerli Kocasırt  7 villages  1 hamlet
Muş Center Üçevler  9 villages 18 hamlets
Siirt Center Sağırsu  8 villages
Şırnak Cizre Sırtköy  4 villages  9 hamlets
Tunceli Mazgırt Bulgurcular  4 villages  2 hamlets
Van Gürpinar Yalınca  6 villages 36 hamlets
Source: J. Jongerden [2007].
55 A sub-region was defined as a cluster of settlements distinguished from other clusters
by economic, cultural, administrative, or social characteristics. Supposed affinity and
coherence between people and villages were to be used as characteristics to delineate
the sub-regions. This type of concept is, in fact, what Scott refers to as a “summary-
description”, that is, designed to allow officials to create (formal) spatial categories and
identify their citizenry [1998: 53-83]. The center-village was defined as the settlement
within a sub-region, which, by its characteristics – size, location and infrastructure –
could  become  a  junction  or  hub  for  other  settlements  and  developed  into  an
intermediate  entity  between the  district  town and  small  villages  and  hamlets.  The
center-village concept did not refer to the spatial concentration of people, but rather to
the spatial concentration of services and the articulation of surrounding settlements
with this center. The concept of center-village was twinned to that of sub-region, with
the  center-village  as  a  nucleus  and  the  sub-region  as  its  surroundings.  The  key
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characteristic  of  the  center-village  concept  was  that  it  created  a  system  of  formal
hierarchical  relations,  in  which  a  cluster  of  settlements  was  administratively
subordinated to a center-village, which was subordinated to a district town, which was
subordinated to a provincial city, which was subordinated to the capital. As such, the
reconstruction of rural space was an attempt to organize legibility and administrative
control.
56 The  Village  Return  and  Rehabilitation  Development  Plan  proposed  twelve  pilot
projects, one per province (Table 2 p. 94). The pilot projects were aimed at the (zonal)
development of twelve sub-regions, each including one center-village and a number of
dependent villages and hamlets (varying between 6 and 42). In addition to the twelve
center-villages, a total of 77 villages and 105 hamlets was planned for the pilot zones,
encompassing 194 settlements all told.
57 That the objective of this plan was the organization of control was also evidenced by
the fact that the master-planners included non-evacuated rural settlements in their
development  plans  as  well  as  evacuated  ones.  In  fact,  the  Diyarbakır  pilot  zone
comprised only  inhabited,  non-evacuated rural  settlements.  As  the master-planners
explained:
Village evacuation in East and Southeast Anatolia occurred on a wide scale. [...] The
solution to the problem [of an unproductive settlement structure] is not to stay
within the boundaries of a return to the evacuated villages. [...] Villages that have
not been evacuated at all have to be included in the alternative models that are part
of the framework of the sub-regional development plan [Oyan et al. eds. 2001: 7].
58 Also, the master-planners did not consider all the evacuated and destroyed settlements
as  qualified  for  return.  The  Bingöl  pilot  plan  showed  that  some  of  the  evacuated
settlements (Küçükbayırlı and Bayırlı) were not to be reconstructed: their populations
were to be resettled at locations more suitable to the state. The organization of a new
settlement structure was paramount, and return subordinated to that.21
59 The military and governors opposed such a return, however, even in the context of the
master-plan. First, they did not favor an organization of space based on clustering, but
preferred the concentration of the population in a few large settlements. Second, they
wanted  to  classify  the settlements  into  two  types:  those  settlements  which  were
appropriate for reconstruction because of the feasibility of turning them into centers
for the spatial concentration of populations, and those that were not. Most likely it
would  not  have  been politically  possible  for  the  plan to  have  been forced through
against this opposition by a relatively weak coalition government (as existed at the
time and had been for  two decades).  Anyway,  it  mattered little,  as  fate  transpired.
When the  Justice  and  Development  Party  (Adalet  ve  Kalkınma  Partisi: AKP)  swept  to
power in 2002 (with large support from the region’s Kurdish population), the master-
plan was withdrawn and the pilot projects abandoned.
 
Conclusions
60 The evacuation and destruction of rural settlements in Turkey’s Southeast was part of
an attempt to organize a space that would make it  possible for the Turkish Armed
Forces to act at will,  unrestricted by social  and environmental obstacles.  In combat
zones, the existence of rural settlements whose inhabitants had not been recruited into
the  village  guard  system  presented  the  army  with  a  double  problem.  First,  the
Village Evacuation and Reconstruction in Kurdistan (1993-2002)
Études rurales, 186 | 2010
15
settlements provided various and vital resources for the enemy; and second, the state
forces  had  to  differentiate  in  military  operations  between  combatants  and  non-
combatants,  with  an  enemy  force  whose  existence  was  partially  dependent  on  a
blurring of that distinction, i.e. the so-called milis. The evacuation and destruction of
rural settlements eliminated these problems. The fact that this contravened the Geneva
Conventions did not mean that it had to be abandoned, but just that it was not officially
announced or openly acknowledged. The true numbers of displaced remain unknown.
61 The  large-scale  evacuation  and  destruction  of  settlements  as  part  of  the  counter-
insurgency  strategy  of  the  Turkish  military against  the  PKK  guerrilla  radically
transformed  the  countryside.  A  contraction  of  space  in  which  the  guerrilla  could
operate was effected through geopolitical and dromopolitical microtactics. Insurgent
territory  was  first  “smoothed”  by  the  population  clearance,  and  then  aggressively
reduced  by  mobile,  well-armed  attack  forces.  Field  domination  was  enabled  by  a
combination of these along with the sheer scale of numbers (in current parlance, a
troop “surge”), including the addition of the casual forces of a newly instituted system
of civil militia. Given that the population not co-opted into the village guard system
was seen to be sympathetic to the PKK cause, any preexisting rift between the Turkish
state army and this local Kurdish population was further widened by the evacuation,
which only served to enable the forces of the state to mistreat its own people. Their
land was effectively regarded as state property, and the surrounding commons (forests,
mountains) usurped in the “national interest”.
62 The state may position itself as the ultimate guarantor of the individual liberty of its
citizens, but the price it exacts for this is the right to determine the nature and scope of
that liberty. In times of conflict, that leads it to define its own space. In times of direct
challenge to the central power, indeed, a civil war of secession, the state may go so far
as to invoke the ultimate territorial sanction, to denude and destroy its own land, as if
it were “cutting off its gangrened left hand with its right” [Akın 1993: 41].
63 With the success of the Turkish military strategy – in combination with the PKK’s own
fatal escalation of the war towards a strategy of conventional warfare – the die was
cast. The illegality of the state’s actions meant that the villagers could not be properly
resettled and compensated (even had this been desired), while the logic of this success
implied that people would not be allowed to simply return to their homes when the
fighting  in  their  area  was  over.  Thus,  the  evacuation  and  destruction  of  rural
settlements has been discussed here as a constitutive part of spatial contraction, but
also put in perspective through discussion of the ensuing peace-based transformation.
64 Plans for return and a reconstruction of rural space advanced by state agencies did not
envisage  that  people  would  go  back  to  their  homes  once  their  communities  were
rebuilt.  The conception of  “return”,  it  is  argued here,  employed a rather Orwellian
doublespeak. The examination of the main rehabilitation plan developed by the state
shows it  to have clearly been based on the implementation of a categorization and
hierarchization of  space that  set  administrative supervision and control  as  a  prime
objective. If the people could not be trusted to support the state, then the state would
have  to  enter  the  lives  of  the  people  more  directly,  through  the  organization  of
settlements and closely controlling the relationship of the center to its periphery. As
such, the master-plan was drafted from the logic of counter-insurgency, even though
the military did not embrace it. We can conclude that the post-war development plan
was actually the continuation of war by different means.
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65 Finally,  notwithstanding  some  drift  back,  the  land  vacated  continues  to  be  largely
empty. Those villagers trying to return have been hampered by the authorities in many
ways, from the refusal of permission to resettle their villages to lack of local service
provision and various forms of bias towards village guards [Jongerden 2007: 252-277].22
Some villages seem to be permanently destroyed, while others have changed character,
for  example  operating  more  as  summer holiday  locations  than living  communities.
Realpolitik sides  with the strong;  the state  designs its  space,  even if  this  sometimes
means returning to a blank canvass, a rural minimalism with barely any design at all.
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
Agamben, Giorgio — 1998, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, Stanford
University Press.
Aker, Tamer, Betül Çelik, Dilek Kurban, Turgay Ünalan and Deniz Yükseker — 2005, 
Türkiye’de Ülke İçinde Yerinden Edilme Sorunu. Tespitler ve Çözüm Önerileri. Istanbul, TESEV.
Akın, Cihangir — 1993, “Güneydogu Anadolu bölgesinde kalkınma: Güvenlik ve istihdamın temini için
cazibe merkezi modeli”, Kooperatifçilik (Sept.-Dec.): 39-49.
Armitage, John — 2000, Beyond Postmodernism. Paul Virilio’s Hypermodern Cultural Theory. Available
at http://www.ctheory.net/ articles.aspx?id=133.
Barkey, Henri and Graham E. Fuller — 1998, Turkey’s Kurdish Question. Boston, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers.
Beckett, Ian F.W. and John Pimlott eds. — 1985, Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency.
London-Sydney, Croom Helm.
Bozarslan, Hamit — 2004, Violence in the Middle East: From Political Struggle to Self-Sacrifice.
Princeton, Markus Wiener Publishers.
Çelik, Ayşe Betul — 2005, “’I Miss My Village’: Forced Kurdish Migrants in Istanbul and Their
Representation in Associations”, New Perspectives on Turkey 32: 137-163.
Cizre Sakallıoglu, Ümit — 2005, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy”, 
Comparative Politics 29 (2): 151-166.
Doğanay, Filiz — 1993, Merkez Köyler. Ankara, Devlet Planlama Teskilati.
Donnell, John C. — 1970, “Expanding Political Participation. The Long Haul from Villagism to
Nationalism”, Asian Survey 10: 688-704.
Ergil, Dogu — 2009, “Kürt Raporu, güvenlik politikalarindan kimlik siyasetine”. Istanbul, Timas
Yayinlari.
Etten, Jacob van, Joost Jongerden, Hugo J. de Vos, Annemarie Klaasse and Esther C.E. van
Hoeve — 2008, “Environmental Destruction as a Counter-Insurgency Strategy in the Kurdistan
Region of Turkey”, Geoforum 39: 1786-1797.
Village Evacuation and Reconstruction in Kurdistan (1993-2002)
Études rurales, 186 | 2010
17
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri — 2004, Multitude, War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New
York, The Penguin Press.
Imset, Ismet G. — 1995, The PKK: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists? Available at http://
www.kurdistan.org/Articles/ismet.html
Jongerden, Joost — 2007, The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds. Leiden-Boston, Brill. — 2009,
“Crafting Space, Making People. The Spatial Design of Nation in Modern Turkey”, European
Journal of Turkish Studies 10: 2-22. — 2010, “Dams and Politics in Turkey. Utilizing Water,
Developing Conflict”, Middle East Policy 17 (1): 137-143.
Jongerden, Joost and Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya — 2010, “Born from the Left. The Making of the
PKK”, in C. Marlies and J. Jongerden eds., Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey. Political Islam, Kemalism
and the Kurdish Issue. Oxon-New York, Routledge.
Jongerden, Joost, Rene Oudshoorn and Henk Laloli — 1997, Het verwoeste Land, berichten van de
oorlog in Turks-Koerdistan. Brede, uitgeverij papieren Tijger.
Kellner, Douglas — 2000, “Virilio, War and Technology. Some Critical Reflections”, in J. Armitage
and P. Virilio eds., From Modernism to Hypermodernism and beyond. London-New Delhi, Thousand
Oaks-Sage.
Kocher, Matthew — 2002, “The Decline of PKK and the Viability of a One-State Solution in
Turkey”, International Journal on Multicultural Studies 4 (1): 1-20. — 2004, “Human Ecology and Civil
War”. PhD thesis in political sciences. University of Chicago.
Marcus, Aliza — 2007, Blood and Belief. The PKK, Turkey and the Kurdish War. New York, New York
University Press.
Moore, Mick — 1984, “Categorizing Space. Urban-Rural or Core-Periphery in Sri Lanka”, Journal
of Development Studies 20 (3): 102-122.
Newsinger, John — 2002, British Counter-Insurgency, from Palestine to Northern Ireland. New York,
Palgrave.
Oyan, Oğuz, Melih Ersoy, H. Çağatay Keskinok, H. Tarık Şengül, Galip Yalman, Remzi
Sönmez and Erdal Kurttaş eds. — 2001, Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi Köye Dönüş ve
Rehabilitasyon Projesi Alt Bölge Gelişme Planı (12 volumes). Ankara, Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi (BKI)-
Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği.
Özdağ, Ümit — 2003, The PKK and Low Intensity Conflict in Turkey. Ankara, Frank Cass.
Pamukoğlu, Osman — 2003, Unutulanlar Dışında Yeni Bir şey Yok, Hakkari ve Kuzey Irak Dağlarındaki
Askerler. Ankara, Harmony.
Ronayne, Maggie — 2004, The Cultural and Environmental Impact of Large Dams in Southeast Turkey.
Galway-London, National University of Ireland-Kurdish Human Rights Project.
Scott, James — 1998, Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed. New Haven, Yale University Press.
Signoles, Aude — 2005, “Gestion des espaces et contrôle politique. Israël au cœur du processus
décisionnel local (1993-2000)”, Études rurales 173-174: 87-108.
Sutton, Keith — 1981, “The Influence of Military Policy on Algerian Rural Development”, 
Geographical Review 71: 379-394.
Tezcan, Sabahat and Koç, İsmet — 2006, Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Population
Survey (TMIDPS). Ankara, Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies.
Village Evacuation and Reconstruction in Kurdistan (1993-2002)
Études rurales, 186 | 2010
18
Virilio, Paul — 2006, Speed and Politics. An Essay on Dromology. New York, Semiotext(e).
Weizman, Eyal — 2007, Hollow Land, Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. London, Verso.
White, Paul — 2000, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in
Turkey. London-New York, Zed.
Woods, Michael D. — 1990, “Rural Awakenings. Grassroots Development and the Cultivation of a
National Past in Rural Sri Lanka”, in J. Spencer ed., Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict.
Abingdon-Oxon, Routledge: 164-183.
Yılmaz, Bediz — 2006, “Far Away, So Close: Social Exclusion and Spatial Relegation in an Inner-
City Slum of Istanbul, Tarlabaşı”, in F. Adaman and Ç. Keyder eds., Poverty and Social Exclusion in
the Suburbs of Large Cities in Turkey. Brussels, European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs
and Equal Opportunities: 26-40.
Zasloff, Joseph J. — 1962-1963, “Rural Resettlement in South Vietnam: The Agroville Program”, 
Pacific Affairs 35: 327-340.
NOTES
1. Human Rights Watch, “Displaced and Disregarded. Turkey’s Failing Village Return
Program”.  Washington  DC,  2002, p. 25.  Available  at  http://hrw.org/reports/2002/
turkey/Turkey1002.pdf 
2. Kurdish Human Rights Project, “Internally Displaced Persons. The Kurds in Turkey”.
London, 2002. Available at www.khrp.org/documents/turkish/ulkeincinde.pdf 
3. The  village  guards  are  a  militia,  legally  established  in  1985  and  which  became
operational from 1987 onwards. About 5,000 men joined this paramilitary force in its
first  year,  a  number  which  had  increased  to  67,000  by  1995.  Village  guards  were
expected to take defensive positions against the PKK and also to participate in military
operations,  some of  which involved cross-border incursions into northern Iraq.  See
HRW, “Weapons Transfer and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey”. Washington
DC, 1995. Available at www.hrw.org/ reports/1995/Turkey.htm 
4. Human Rights Watch, “Displaced and Disregarded. Turkey’s Failing Village Return
Program”.  Washington  DC,  2002, p. 25.  Available  at  http://hrw.org/reports/2002/
turkey/Turkey1002.pdf 
5. In Dersim/Tunceli,  for example, the Teacher’s Training School was a recruitment
focus of the movement [Jongerden and Akkaya 2010].
6. Theoretically, a unit was composed of a commander, a vice-commander, a political
commissary, someone operating a machine-gun and someone operating a RPG rocket
launcher. In PKK terminology, this was named a manga, or squad. Three squads formed
a takım, or platoon, and three platoons a company or bölük. 
7. Devlet  Planlama  TeŞkilatı  (State  Planning  Organization),  “Türkiye’de  Yerlesme
Merkezlerinin  Kademelenmesi.  Ülke  Yerlesme  Merkezleri  Sistem”,  Cilt  1-2.  Ankara,
Yayini, 1982. 
8. In fact, the milis constituted a major part of the total PKK force. In his study of the
PKK, P. White [2000: 143] presents the figures of the US State Department, according to
which the PKK in 1995 had a guerrilla force of about 15,000 supported by a part-time
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militia of 75,000. According to D. Ergil [2009: 382] the PKK had a guerrilla force of 20,000
men, some 10,000 armed militants (milis) in the country and 500,000 active supporters.
9. The concept of “dromopolitics” comes from P. Virilio [2006], who emphasizes the
importance of the modern technologies of motion and acceleration. The subtitle of this
work, “Essays on dromology”, refers to the need for a knowledge or science of speed,
which,  according to Virilio,  lays at  the foundation of  modern society.  In respect to
armed conflict, the disappearance of traditional defenders of spaces or territories, the
castles and fortified cities of the Middle Ages and the bunkers and trenches of more
recent times, Virilio argues, is the consequence of new weapons systems and military
strategies  based  on  high  speed  and  mobility,  which  have  transformed  positional
warfare  into  wars  of  movement.  The need for  fortification,  important  in  positional
warfare, was surpassed by the need for mobility [Armitage 2000; Kellner 2000]. 
10. The evacuation of rural settlements was made possible in 1987 by Decree No. 285
concerning the  state  of  emergency,  which granted formal  authority  for  this  to  the
Regional  Governor  (a  kind  of  “super-governor”  appointed  by  Ankara  for  all  the
provinces  of  the  state  of  emergency area,  i.e.  the  whole  of  Southeast  Turkey).  The
decree  enabled  the  governor  to  order  the  temporary  or  permanent  evacuation  of
settlements  in  the  interest  of  “public  security”  (in  reality,  military  commanders
decided about the evacuation of rural settlements). The second Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions (1977) (ratified by Turkey) had banned this practice, but the
resettlement of the population was never declared openly as official (civil or military)
policy. 
11. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. Vol. IX (1937). Available at http://www.marxists.org/
reference/archive/mao/works/ 1937/guerrilla-warfare/ ch01.htm
12. “Tunceli” is the modern, official (Turkish replacement) name for the province of
Dersim,  the  old  (Zazaki/Kurdish)  name.  The  twentieth  century  program  of
Turkification in the new republic included an attempt to claim the space through name
changes to thousands of settlements [Jongerden 2009]. 
13. Actually, the southeast of Turkey had been ruled under martial law and emergency
regulations since 1927, and thus been a zone of weak citizenship since long before the
period here considered. Until 1952, most of the area (Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari,
Mardin,  Siirt,  Urfa,  and  Van)  was  administered  by  an  Inspector  General,  an  office
established  in  1927  to  bring  “order  and  discipline”.  In  1935,  two further  Inspector
Generals were appointed to administer Kurdish populated areas, one for the “Murat
and Munzur” region, covering Dersim/Tunceli, and the other for the northern part of
the East, covering Ağri, Çoruh, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gümüshane, Kars, and Trabzon. The
Southeast was closed to foreigners until 1965, and the region subsequently ruled under
martial law or state of emergency from 1980. The OHAL state of emergency area was
created in 1983, before the PKK started its military campaign, and the office of the
Regional Governor established in 1987, maintaining military control in the Southeast
after executive power had elsewhere been transferred back to the civilian authorities
following the 1980 coup d’État. Civilian rule was later returned to the area, slowly and
piecemeal,  until  the final lifting of OHAL law from the remaining four provinces to
which it applied in 2002. 
14. The spatially-grounded state of exception in its extreme form was the kill-zone. In a
kill-zone, human existence is reduced to what G. Agamben [1998] calls “bare life”, that
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is to say, deprived of rights and only included in the political order in the form of its
exclusion, i.e. qualified to be killed. 
15. Ministry of Defense, “Defense White Paper”, Ankara, 2000. 
16. Kurdish  Human  Rights  Project,  “Internally  Displaced  Persons.  The  Kurds  in
Turkey”.  London,  2002, pp. 118-120.  Available  at  www.khrp.org/documents/turkish/
ulkeincinde.pdf 
17. Meclis  Araştirmasi  Komis yonu,  “Doğu  ve  Güneydoğu  Anadolu’da  Boşaltilan
Yerleşim  Birimleri  Nedeniyle  Göç  Eden  Yurttaşlarimizin  Sorunlarin  Araştirlarak
Alinmasi Gereken Tedbilerin Tespit Edilmesi Amaciyla Kurulan”. Report, December 1st
1997, p. 44. Ankara, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. 
18. Turkey had requested a loan of 50 million dollars from the World Bank for the toplu
kondu plan and 278 million dollars from the European Community for the toplu çiftlik
plan, but both requests were denied, the former for reasons undisclosed and the latter
because Turkey was seen to be shifting the economic cost of the village evacuation onto
Europe [Jongerden 2007].
19. At the time of the study, Prof. Dr. Oğuz Oyan was president of the Turkish Social
Sciences Association (Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği: TSBD) and vice-president of the CHP;
Dr.  Melih  Ersoy  was  professor  at  the  Department  of  Urban and Regional  Planning,
Faculty of Architecture, Middle East Technical University in Ankara. 
20. GAP  has  now  expanded  to  become  “a  multi-sector  and  integrated  regional
development effort approached in the context of sustainable development” covering
the entire southeast region. See http://www.gap.gov.tr/ gap_eng.php?sayfa=English/
Ggbilgi/gnedir.html 
21. Another issue is that settlements inhabited by village guards recruited during the
original  scorched-earth  campaign  were  clustered  with  evacuated  and  destroyed
settlements in the pilot projects. It would appear that prospective returnees were to be
settled alongside village guards, as far as information is available – leastways, this was
the case with the projects in the provinces of  Batman, Bingöl,  Bitlis,  Hakkari,  Muş,
Şırnak and Van. 
22. Human Rights Watch, “Displaced and Disregarded. Turkey’s Failing Village Return




Le monde rural a souvent été le théâtre de luttes armées et de contre-insurrections. Pourtant on
a  prêté  peu  d’attention  à  ce  phénomène.  L’observation  des  transformations  récentes  des
campagnes du Kurdistan turc permet de discuter des stratégies de contre-insurrection turque,
d’un point de vue à la fois militaire et politique ; de l’évacuation et de la destruction des villages
lors des conflits ; et des plans de développement relatifs à la zone en guerre. Cette étude révèle
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que les plans de reconstruction et de développement mis en œuvre par le gouvernement turc
prolongent la guerre, mais en usant d’autres moyens.
The countryside has been used as a medium for warfare and affected by counterinsurgency, but
this  has  received  relatively  little  attention.  Transformations  of  the  countryside  in  Turkish
Kurdistan  serve  as  the  basis  for  discussing:  Turkish  counterinsurgency  strategies  from  both
military and political perspectives; the evacuation and destruction of villages in the course of
campaigns;  and development plans for the war zone.  A major conclusion is  that the Turkish
government’s reconstruction and development plans continue the war by using other means.
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